Knowing the truth about the Kennedy Assassination is understanding America today.

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Postby Bruce Patrick Brychek » Thu Feb 01, 2018 4:41 pm


Dear JFK Murder Solved Forum Members and Readers:



Food For Thought:

Exon-Mobil, sold in the U.S. appears to be the only U.S. owned major oil and petroleum company.

CITGO Oil and Petroleum, sold in the U.S., is owned by the Venezuelan Communists.

SHELL Oil and Petroleum, sold in the U.S. is owned by Royal Dutch Shell in Holland and related areas.

BP, British Petroleum, sold in the U.S., appears to be owned by and through Great Britain. Remember that the Rockefeller's began Standard Oil, that became AMERICAN Oil, then AMOCO. But surprisingly was "apparently totally sold" to Great Britain, morphing into BP, British Petroleum.

Dick Cheney moved Halliburton to the Burge, Dubai Complex. Halliburton sells a majority of U.S. Military Supplies to the Military Branches and the Pentagon, totally Tax Free.

Simultaneously, pay attention to the shifting to foreign countries.

HARRIS Bank from Chicago, Illinois, has been sold to a Canadian Consortium, and is now called BMO-Harris Bank, BANK OF MONTREAL.


Great Britain's MI-5 and MI-6 was assistive, powerful, and supportive of the developments of BOTH the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, the Central Intelligence Group, and the Central Intelligence Agency, AND ISRAEL'S MOSSAD.

Below we read and study of Great Britain's influence and support of the U.S. involvement in the 1950's ousting of Mossadeq in Iran.


For example, for the Removal of JFK we have read and/or heard:

* The Communist's did it.

* The Cuban's did it.

* The Israeli's and/or Mossad did it.

* The Nazi's did it.

* The Russian's did it.



As always, I strongly recommend that you first read, research, and study material completely yourself about a Subject Matter, and then formulate your own Opinions and Theories.

Any additional analyses, interviews, investigations, readings, research, studies, thoughts, or writings on any aspect of this Subject Matter ?

Bear in mind that we are trying to attract and educate a Whole New Generation of JFK Researchers who may not be as well versed as you.

Comments ?



1953 Iran Coup: New U.S. Documents Confirm British Approached U.S. in Late 1952 About Ousting Mosaddeq.
State Department Temporarily Declined, in Part Because U.S. Was Still Hoping to Reach Oil Deal with Iranian Prime
MinisterPaul Nitze Proposed Targeting Ayatollah Kashani and Tudeh Party as Test before Attempting Full-blown Coup
Just-Declassified Documents Were Withheld from Foreign Relations of the United States Volume on Iran Coup Published
in 2017

Posted August 8, 2017
National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 601
Edited by Malcolm Byrne and Mark Gasiorowski
For more information contact: 202/994-7000 and nsarchiv@gwu.edu
Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran
June 22, 2004

Iran 1953: State Department Finally Releases Updated History
June 15, 2017

The Battle for Iran, 1953
June 27, 2014

CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup
August 19, 2013

The Trump administration wants regime change in Iran. But regime change usually doesn’t work.
The Washington Post
Jul 31, 2017

New Documents Show US Role in 1953 Iranian Coup
WNYC Radio
Jun 30, 2017

US quietly publishes once-expunged papers on 1953 Iran coup
ABC News
Jun 29, 2017

US Publishes full papers showing how CIA plotted 1953 Iran coup
The Times of Israel
Jun 29, 2017

US Quietly Publishes Once-Expunged Papers on 1953 Iran Coup
Associated Press
Jun 29, 2017

Oblivious to History, Trump's Turning Up the Heat on Iran. He Should Look at the 1953 CIA Coup
The Daily Beast
Jun 26, 2017

64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian Coup
Foreign Policy
Jun 20, 2017

Washington, D.C., August 8, 2017 – The British Foreign Office approached the Truman administration on more than one
occasion in late 1952 to propose a coup to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, according to freshly
declassified State Department documents. Posted today for the first time, two previously Top-Secret memoranda from
senior officials at State refer to a series of communications and meetings beginning in October 1952 in which British
officials tried to win U.S. approval of Mosaddeq’s ouster.

The British government has steadfastly refused to release any materials that directly refer to its role in the operation that
eventually took place in August 1953, and has consistently pressed the United States not to reveal any substantiation from
American files. In fact, evidence has existed for years that the British were intimately involved in promoting and then
planning the overthrow of Mosaddeq. The most compelling sources include a leaked CIA after-action report written in
1954 and memoir accounts by various coup participants.

Today’s posting consists of the most explicit, officially declassified records on the subject released to date by any

The two documents were originally considered for inclusion in the latest official U.S. publication on the coup period. In
June 2017, the State Department published a 1,007-page compilation of declassified State, Central Intelligence Agency,
and National Security Council documents as part of its Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. But while
both records are mentioned in the volume by title and date, their content was withheld in its entirety.

The first memo in the posting is entitled “Proposal to Organize a Coup d’etat in Iran,” and is dated November 26, 1952. In
it, Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade informs his superior, Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews,
that Britain’s Minister in Washington, Sir Christopher Steel, has requested a meeting to discuss a possible coup. He reminds
Matthews that the British Embassy first raised the idea on paper on October 8, 1952. He goes on to give his own views
about the concept, which are generally negative, yet recommends that Matthews take the meeting.

Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian, and African Affairs, 1952-1955 (Photo: Harry S.
Truman Library & Museum)

The second memo, similarly entitled “British Proposal to Organize a Coup d’etat in Iran,” and dated December 3, 1952, is
the State Department’s record of the meeting with Steel (date unclear). Other officials from both governments attended the
session, notably Paul Nitze, Director of Policy Planning at the State Department.

The authors of today’s posting filed separate Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) requests to the National Archives
and Records Administration (NARA) for the two memoranda following the June 2017 publication of the new FRUS volume.
That compilation was originally commissioned in the early 1990s as a supplement to a previous iteration that covered the
same time period but, on political and intelligence grounds, omitted all references to the American and British roles in the
coup. The 2017 volume contains rich detail about American perspectives on Iran along with records describing the planning
and execution of the operation, but it barely mentions Great Britain's contributions – undoubtedly because of specific British
requests not to do so. (For a document-based account of this issue, see the National Security Archive’s posting of August 19,
2013.) A number of other records that have been withheld from the volume – and are currently the subject of MDR requests
by the National Security Archive – presumably contain more detail about London’s activities.

To their credit, NARA responded immediately and positively to the MDRs. However, even before the official replies arrived,
Tulane University Professor Mark Gasiorowski had located the original records while conducting research at NARA in
College Park, Maryland, in July 2017. The November 26 document was marked declassified on May 17, 2017, just a month
before the FRUS volume appeared. An earlier State Department declassification review stamp indicated a downgrade in
classification to Secret in 1999, and authorization to declassify “with concurrence of CIA after STATE approves release or
2025.” In other words, release might not have occurred until the year 2025 (though even that cannot be taken as a given).
The December 3 document has similar markings, except the 1999 stamp notes that full declassification would have to follow
“release [of] info by GBR or 2025.” GBR refers to the British government – further confirmation that London was – at least
originally – deemed to have authority over when, or whether, U.S. archival documents (not British records) would be allowed
to be seen by the American public. However, it is not clear whether British officials were ultimately consulted about the
release of these particular documents in 2017.

The documents are of great interest on several levels. As indicated, they are the first officially released confirmation of
Britain’s expressed aim in late 1952 to persuade Washington to help oust Mosaddeq.[1] They also provide insights into
how the British conceived of the political scene inside Iran and why a coup was called for, in their view. At the early December
meeting, Sir Christopher Steel laid out what the memo describes as the "only three possible lines which events in Iran might
take." In essence, Steel commented, Mossadeq could either stay in power and take action against the Communist (or Tudeh)
party, or he would leave office and be replaced by someone who would do so, or there would be no change and "the
Communists would gradually take control." Steel declared that the Iranian prime minister was highly unlikely to act firmly
against the Communists but he professed to be uncommitted for the time being toward actually mounting a coup. His only
purpose at the meeting with Mathews and Nitze, he claimed, was to propose the idea and suggest that the British and
American governments should seriously consider taking action along those lines.

H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State, 1950-1953 (Photo: Harry S. Truman Library & Museum)

This scrupulously mild approach reflects another interesting aspect of the memoranda – what they reveal about British
tactics in their appeal to the Americans. Scholars of the coup generally agree that London’s overriding objective in the Iran
crisis was to restore their stake in Iran's petroleum industry by virtually any available means, including military action. But
ever since Mosaddeq nationalized the industry in Spring 1951 (then expelled British diplomats and intelligence officials from
the country the following October – incidentally, not long after the first British-U.S. coup discussions mentioned in the
Byroade memo), the Truman administration had balked at Britain’s persistent prodding for radical action – beyond the
substantial step Washington had already taken of supporting an economic boycott against Iran. President Harry Truman
and Secretary of State Dean Acheson repeatedly insisted that their priority was to keep the Soviet Union and its Communist
allies in Iran from gaining any advantage from the crisis. For Truman and Acheson, overtly protecting Britain's colonial
interests was a non-starter because they believed it would play into Communist hands.

By late 1952, the British had adapted their methods and, as the new records confirm, couched the subject in terms that
would be more appealing to the Americans – not to ask for their help in reclaiming control of Iranian oil but to assist in
"combating Communism in Iran." Steel's claim that "the British government had not yet come to any definite conclusions"
about how exactly to accomplish the goal seems clearly aimed at not putting off the American side any further, after months
of London's steady, militant drumbeat.

The Truman administration never agreed to the idea of Mosaddeq’s overthrow. To the end of his term in January 1953, the
president believed that the West’s best hope for an exit strategy to the crisis lay in working with the Iranian prime minister,
not against him. The November 26 memo, in fact, importantly confirms that the administration was still planning to side with
Mosaddeq’s government against what they evidently saw as Britain’s lack of cooperation in coming to an equitable oil
agreement. “One element which must be taken into consideration in making our decision" about a coup, wrote Byroade,
"is that we are presently thinking of unilateral action to assist the Mosadeq Government in the event that the British do not
agree to an oil settlement acceptable to Mosadeq." Presumably strugglingto suppress any expression of irony, Byroade
continued, "It would be virtually impossible to proceed with plans to overthrow Dr. Mosadeq while at the same time giving
him open assistance."

Byroade went on to assess Britain’s motives in revisiting their proposal and to predict the ramifications of each possible
U.S. response. "[I]t is not inconceivable that one reason for the British suggestion is a desire to forestall unilateral American
assistance to Mosadeq." If the U.S. were to back the overthrow it "might lead them to be less flexible with regard to new oil
settlement proposals," whereas "our refusal to consider the new plan for a coup might induce them to make more determined
efforts to reach an agreement with Mosadeq."

Matthews backed Byroade’s position in his conversation with Steel. The Americans specifically did not rule out a coup even
though they were clearly not enthusiastic about it. At this point in the December 3 memo, Matthews alluded to another
dimension of the British approach. Other records now available, including a leaked internal CIA history of the coup, indicate
that members of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service were also meeting with their counterparts in the United States in
November 1952. Those officials are not named here (they were Christopher Montague Woodhouse and Sam Falle[2]) but
Matthews pointedly ruled out any further contacts “between CIA and the British intelligence representatives on the subject
until further notice.” In addition, the American side pointed out that President Truman was about to leave office. Steel politely
acknowledged this but, reflecting a sense of urgency – and subtle pressure – remarked that “it would probably be necessary
to take a decision by the end of January, since the best time for the coup would be in the Spring.” The memo does not explain
why this would be the case.

Two other intriguing points about the memos are worth noting. One is the comment at the December 3 meeting by John
Jernegan, Byroade’s deputy, that Loy Henderson, the U.S. Ambassador to Tehran, “believed Mosadeq was sincerely anti
-communist.” Jernegan was responding to the British conclusion that the prime minister “was by nature too vacillating to take
a strong stand” against the Tudeh. According to Jernegan, Henderson would have argued that if Mosaddeq could only get
an oil settlement or “otherwise strengthen the financial position of his Government,” he would be tougher on the Tudeh. This
reading of Henderson goes sharply against many other accounts of his views, which as the crisis unfolded increasingly
dismissed the Iranian prime minister as a lunatic. Henderson’s actual opinions about and influence on U.S. policy are one
of many elements of the 1953 narrative that are still subject to lively debate.

Finally, Paul Nitze’s role in the coup saga has generally received scant attention, although he appears several times in the
new FRUS volume published in 2017. In the December 3 memo printed here, he spoke up on the question of how likely the
theoretical operation was to be successful. The celebrated Cold War strategist showed his penchant for bare-knuckle tactics
by asking if the unnamed group the British proposed to work with inside Iran might not agree to undertake a trial run targeting
the politically active Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani along with the Tudeh. If that operation succeeded, Nitze said, it would bode
well for an actual coup d’etat. The memo records a respectful but unanimous rejection of the scheme.

Other fascinating insights appear in the new memos relating to American and British perspectives on the Iran crisis and how to
cope with it. Along the way, they raise a number of larger themes relevant to the coup, not least the nuanced question of how
closely the two allies’ interests in Iran actually intersected.


Document 01
State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, Byroade to Matthews, "Proposal to Organize a Coup d'etat in Iran," Top
Secret, November 26, 1952

Source: NARA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1950-54 Central Decimal File, File: 788.00/11-2652
Henry Byroade provides his superior, H. Freeman Matthews with a moderately lengthy memo on Great Britain's desire to
promote a coup against the Mosaddeq government. He notes that the idea first came up in a paper the British presented to
the Americans on October 8, 1952. Since then, three meetings had been held but the conclusion was that the prospects
were not hopeful. The lack of a viable substitute for Mosaddeq and the risk of a Tudeh counter-action were among the

Another very interesting argument is the fact that the U.S. at the time has plans to try to prop up Mosaddeq in some way
in the event the British continue to be unsupportive of an oil deal. This is a new piece of evidence on the open question of
whether the U.S. government genuinely sided with the Iranian prime minister against their principal ally, or simply paid lip
service to the idea. Byroade offers a list of his own doubts about the coup proposal but still recommends that Matthews
meet with British Minister Sir Christopher Steel to hear him out.

Document 02
State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, "British Proposal to Organize a Coup d'etat in Iran," Top Secret, December
3, 1952

Source: NARA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1950-54 Central Decimal File, File: 788.00/12-352
H. Freeman Matthews, Paul Nitze and John Jernegan represent the State Department at this meeting with senior British
Embassy representatives in Washington. This is the meeting Henry Byroade mentioned in the above memo to Matthews.
According to this record, the Americans are skeptical about the prospects for a successful coup and are further disinclined
because the Truman administration will shortly be replaced and therefore is even less in a position to act on an issue of this
kind. The British purport to be unconvinced themselves about the idea, yet they pointedly note that they will probably need
an American decision within a few weeks because they would prefer to carry out the operation in Spring. Subtlety in the wake
of months of exhortations to the U.S. government seems to have been the British modus operandi at this stage.
[1] It is possible that random references in a small handful of declassified documents point to the British role but none do so
as directly or in the level of detail presented in these memoranda.

[2] Falle was ostensibly a Foreign Office official. Whether intentionally or not, the other British representative at the meeting,
Bernard Burrows, Counselor at the Embassy in Washington, referred specifically to “the two British intelligence officers now in
Washington...,” according to Matthews’ memo.

National Security Archive
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The George Washington University
2130 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C., 20037
Phone: 202/994-7000
Fax: 202/994/7005
Bruce Patrick Brychek
Posts: 2084
Joined: Sat May 26, 2007 9:09 am


Postby Phil Dragoo » Fri Feb 02, 2018 12:18 am

Scott Ritter in Huffington Post:

Parsing Hillary Clinton’s Disingenuous Foreign Policy Record


Author touts the politician as deeply involved in regime change vis-a-vis Libya and Syria.

Ritter stipulates Stevens was on the ground executing policy set by Clinton in company with intelligence--despite the principal's projecting responsibility on CIA.

Article states arms were acquired and transshipped to Turkey and Qatar for use in ousting Assad.

Hillary and Obama insisted a video caused a protest--when it was their policy of regime change--

--and her actions in Libya were illegal--under UN guidelines--requiring NATO (Old World) intercession [see also Gladio]

Now the Old World is swept by Muslim invasion creating Orwellian ISOC not as English Socialism but Islamic Socialism

Jack Philby brokered the oil divestment in favor of Saud--Hillary seen courting monies from the region, selling foreign policy futures

now as valid as Confederate money

The rage continues--the paradox: Merkel et al cannot but hate Trump for supporting Brexit

yet Davos embraces Trump prosperity because you know business is business

and Marx who never bathed could only win friends and influence people by starving them or freezing them in the gulag

Tension persists, gentlemen read each other's mail, and as Gates told Leahy

"Governments lie to each other--it's how business gets done.

Steele represents Old World support of the Confederacy

Caesar must always check six

Preparata put much stock in Montagu Norman conjuring Hitler

and Stephenson (Intrepid) applauded Donovan as "one of our own"

Generations of inbreeding have made the European royalty mean and stupid--a prince disinvites the American president

yet we revisit the noble spirit of the 300 in the depiction of Churchill in The Darkest Hour

Global Warming? Russia acts for warm-water ports to this day

The so-glorious Old World for so long has thrived under the U.S. umbrella

providing the highly-touted free government health care

now coming in a package deal with rape by savages and indifference from mayors deaf to victims' cries

so near the nasal minaret Grammy's Obama so loved

The moving finger writes

Now comes the American editor

User avatar
Phil Dragoo
Posts: 741
Joined: Thu Oct 22, 2009 8:09 am

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